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Legislative history seems inextricably intertwined with the concept of legislative
intentexamining legislative history makes sense only if one wishes to determine
legislative intent. The contestants on both sides of the current battle over us-
ing legislative history may agree on little, but they seem to agree on this point.
Legislative history’s devotees argue that determining legislative intent is the goal
of statutory interpretation, and the legitimacy of referring to legislative history
seems to follow without much argument. That is, legislative history merely serves
as a tool to find illusive legislative intent, but, in itself, lacks significance. Those
who attack legislative history also view it as inexorably coupled with the con-
cept of legislative intent. Thus, they argue against the use of legislative history
by attempting to show that “legislative intent” does not provide a proper basis for
interpreting statutes. Alternatively, they argue that ”legislative history” provides
poor evidence of ”legislative intent,” and thus holds scant value because it is useful
only as evidence of intent. In this paper, I show that one can accept the arguments
that legislative intent is chimerical and that legislative history provides a poor tool
for discovering any legislative intent that exists, and yet continue to believe that
some legislative history retains an important place in the interpretive enterprise.
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Legislative history seems inextricably intertwined with the concept of legislative intent-
examining legislative history makes sense only if one wishes to determine legislative intent. The
contestants on both sides of the current battle over using legislative history may agree on little, but
they seem to agree on this point.   Legislative history’s devotees argue that determining legislative
intent is the goal of statutory interpretation, and the legitimacy of referring to legislative history
seems to follow without much argument. That is, legislative history merely serves as a tool to find
illusive legislative intent, but, in itself, lacks significance. Those who attack legislative history also
view it as inexorably coupled with the concept of legislative intent. Thus, they argue against the use
of legislative history by attempting to show that "legislative intent" does not provide a proper basis
for interpreting statutes. Alternatively, they argue that "legislative history" provides poor evidence
of "legislative intent," and thus holds scant value because it is useful only as evidence of intent.  In
this paper, I show that one can accept the arguments that legislative intent is chimerical and that
legislative history provides a poor tool for discovering any legislative intent that exists, and yet
continue to believe that some legislative history retains an important place in the interpretive
enterprise.
 The reigning methodology of statutory construction involves the search for legislative intent.
As the Supreme Court has proclaimed, the touchstone of interpretation is finding legislative intent.
Courts initially relied not only on the text of the statute but also on a very limited range of
legislatively-produced documents, primarily committee reports and statements of the floor manager
of the relevant legislation, to discern legislative intent. Courts justified that approach by relying upon
a "delegation-assent" argument — Congress delegates the task of formulating legislation to
committees and when it votes on the statute it votes on whether to approve the work of the
committee, including the committee's interpretation of the statute.
 Two problems emerged. First, judicial practice outstripped this justification for using
legislative history, and courts began to use almost anything they could find to discover legislative
intent.  Second, textualists challenged the concept of legislative intent. They argued that only the
vote on a statute by the legislative body had legal significance and that such a vote expressed
approval of only the statutory text, not any committee's intent. Intentionalist scholars have not
produced a terribly convincing response to this challenge. For example, they have not provided a
basis for viewing legislators as voting on anything other than the text of the statute. This paper
supplies the missing argument, while distinguishing the types of legislative history that courts should
consider from those they should not. Members of Congress should be viewed as having an obligation
to vote on both the text of the statute and institutional explanations of those statutes. This duty
derives from the concomitant duties of legislatures to explain statutes and avoid misleading the
public.
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New textualism, intentionalism, and my approach rest upon contrasting premises.  The new1
textualist approach rests on three premises. First, the legislature's vote on a statute is the only
significant event in the legislative process. This reflects the view that the legislative process merely
provides a forum for the expression of preferences. It also reflects a failure to consider Congress as
an institution that is greater than its individual members. Second, the vote on a statute is a vote only
on the text of the statute. Third, rarely will members of the legislature share the same subjective
intent with respect to a statute.  The new textualist methodology is objective  — it requires a2
determination of the meaning that a reasonable person would accord to text, and the only legally
relevant text is the statute.
According to the Intentionalist Approach, at least as described by its critics, the vote on a
statute is the only event of legal significance in the legislative process. Thus intentionalism, like new
textualism, seems to regard the legislative process as nothing more than a mechanism for aggregating
preferences. However, contrary to new textualists, intentionalists view the vote for a statute as the
enactment of the subjective intent of a majority of legislators or some select smaller group of
legislators (either members of the relevant standing committee, the drafters of the legislation, the
typical legislator who helped form the victorious majority, i.e., the typical majority voter, or the
legislators whose votes were necessary for the bill's passage but were most ambivalent, i.e., swing
voters). Also contrary to new textualists, intentionalists believe that the members of the victorious
majority will often share a subjective intent. Their methodology is subjective — at base they attempt
to discern the subjective intent of some person or group.
The delegation-assent approach seeks to expand the number of legally-significant events
beyond floor actions by according committee decisions significance. Advocates of such an approach
regard committees as agents whose actions are then approved by their principal — the legislature.
However, their failure to provide a convincing basis for finding such assent undermines their
approach.
The approach proposed in this Paper focuses on institutional obligations and institutional
actions: the responsibility of Congress as an institution to explain statutes as well as enact them, and
the actions Congress takes to explain those statutes in the form of committee reports and floor
manager statements. As a result, this approach views the vote on a statute as a vote on the text plus
certain documents comprising the "public justification" of the statute. In addition, because members
have a duty to consider the public justification of a statute when they vote, the lack of a joint
subjective intent becomes unimportant because members can be viewed as constructively assenting
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-3-
to the text of the statute and the accompanying institutional explanatory materials. Thus, the
approach is objective, like new textualism, focusing on the reasonable interpretation of text rather
than subjective intentions of legislators. However, the approach in this Paper expands the text that
must be recognized as relevant to interpretation to include institutional explanations as well as
statutory text.3
After setting forth my public justification approach, I will address one final new textualist
argument — that judicial reliance on legislative history has a detrimental effect on the legislative
process itself.  New textualists argue that reliance on legislative history encourages legislatures to
enact unduly vague statutes and unduly enhances the power of legislative minorities, congressional
staff, and lobbyists.  I will suggest that these instrumentalist concerns are not persuasive if one
rejects new textualists’ intrinsic arguments for their approach.  Not only is it inappropriate for courts
to rely solely on instrumental reasons to justify their interpretive approach, but the new textualist
position in particular embodies an unwarranted lack of respect for Congress’ assessment of the
legislative process.
 
I. The Duty to Explain
A. The Basis of the Duty
We view legislative history as having value only as evidence of the subjective intent of
legislators. However, statements can be accorded significance apart from their value as evidence of
the speaker's subjective intent. Promises illustrate this point. A person making a promise creates an
obligation for himself, regardless of whether he intends to keep the promise at the moment of
utterance. The recipient of the promise can justifiably rely upon it without determining whether the
promise actually reflected the subjective intent of the promisor. As Kent Greenawalt notes, "[t]he
individual who promises creates social obligations for himself and confers social claims on others;"
such obligations are created and claims conferred whether or not the promisor intended to act as
promised.  Legislative history should be recognized as possessing significance apart from its value4
as evidence of legislators' subjective intent, much like promises have independent significance. In
other words, legislative explanations should have some legal effect whether or not they actually
reflect any legislator's state of mind.
A legislature's explanation of a statute itself merits recognition as an act of legal significance.
Such an approach toward legislative history rests on the twin premises that legislatures have an
obligation to justify statutes they enact and that at a minimum legislatures should not mislead the
public.  
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 For example, shareholders have the right to demand explanations from corporate officers for decisions6
those officers make in managing the corporation.   It would be anomalous if Congress owed citizens less of a duty to
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  Moreover, a government that refuses to disclose information to the public treats citizens as outsiders.7
Joseph Vining, The Authoritative and the Authoritarian 43 (1986)("disclosure, absence of deception, almost defines
what it means to be inside rather than outside an entity");Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom 85 (William E.
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 Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 24-27.8
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The Obligation to Explain.  Congress's obligation to explain, the first of the twin premises,
rests on two propositions.  First, Congress's obligation to explain derives from the respect that
government owes its citizens.  In democracies, citizens are sovereign, and legislatures merely act on
the behalf of citizens. Accordingly, legislatures owe the public a justification for actions taken in
their name. Ordinarily, actors have no obligation to explain their actions to those who are not the
source of their authority.  For example, military commanders need not explain their commands to
subordinates, because they do not derive their authority from those subordinates.   Yet, because5
legislatures derive their authority from the people they govern, the proper analogy is to those
relationships, such as the principle-agent relationship, in which explanations are owed.   Indeed,6
knowledge of the rationale for an agent's action is essential to maintaining control over the agent.
Thus, knowledge of legislative rationales is critical to the citizenry's ability to control its
government.7
Some First Amendment theorists have grounded the protection of free speech in the
sovereignty of the people and the consequent need to ensure that “the people” can learn about
government activities. Such arguments support a duty of explanation. Alexander Meiklejohn was
one of the most systematic exponents of the theory that free speech is an integral part of popular
sovereignty. Meiklejohn argued that American government is controlled by "the people" and that to
intelligently control the government, the electorate, not merely government officials, must have
access to all important information and debate. However Meiklejohn, who focused on government
suppression of private citizens' speech, envisioned only a modest affirmative role for government
with respect to speech. The government could act as moderator, controlling the "time, place, and
manner" of speech so that the public debate did not devolve into a cacophony of meaninglessness.8
Meiklejohn also advocated government efforts to encourage public debate by both providing citizens
a general education, so that they can take part in governing, and establishing fora in which the
citizenry can discuss public issues.  9
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Cass Sunstein makes a similar argument when he relates the First Amendment to the needs
of citizens as governing sovereigns.    In his view, the First Amendment requires the government10
to do more than refrain from interfering with communication between private parties regarding
matters of government; it imposes an affirmative obligation on the government to publicize its
activities.  Similarly, Justice Stevens and others have argued that the public has a right to discover11
the manner in which the government operates public institutions, such as prisons. Therefore,
government officials should not have absolute discretion to prevent the public and media from
entering such institutions to observe their operation.  Justice Stevens and others derive this right of12
access from the citizenry’s role in self-governance.
These theories, like my argument that legislatures have a duty of explanation, are grounded
in citizens' status as sovereigns and their right to learn about their government's activities. In other
words, these theories incorporate a view of the importance of information about government in a
democracy. A subtle difference remains between those theories and mine. Meiklejohn's, Sunstein's,
and Stevens's arguments focus upon government either divulging information that already exists or
allowing others to observe government operations or proceedings that will actually occur, they do
not require the affirmative development of explanations (or the production of anything that would
not otherwise exist).
 Thus, the people could have a right of access to all legislative proceedings and all of the facts
that served as a basis for legislative deliberation, without a legislature providing any coherent
rationale setting forth its collective explanation for its action. However, drawing such a line makes
little sense — the populace is no less entitled to know the rationale for decisions than the facts
underlying governmental actions or the statements made by representatives during legislative
deliberations. Indeed, there may be no sharp distinction between rules and their justifications — the
latter are really intertwined with the former.13
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In addition, providing explanations to citizens affected by governmental actions is essential
to according them respect as autonomous human beings.  Professor Laurence Tribe has observed
that:
both the right to be heard from, and the right to be told why, are
analytically distinct from the right to secure a different outcome; these
rights to interchange express the elementary idea that to be a person,
rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about what is done with
one.14
Similarly, Mortimer and Stanford Kadish argue that "the principle that people must justify
undertaking an action when others are affected . . . flows from an underlying commitment that other
people are entitled to be treated as autonomous and free beings rather than manipulable things —
a commitment that has informed . . . the entire Western liberal tradition."   Many have made similar15
arguments.16
Indeed, in some situations, the respect due those affected by a decision may provide a more
cogent justification for a duty to explain than the concept of popular sovereignty. Because courts,
and to a lesser extent administrative agencies, are subject to only indirect popular control, a popular
sovereignty argument for a duty to explain seems somewhat strained in those contexts. The argument
for an explanation based on respect, however, fully applies to courts and agencies, regardless of the
attenuated nature of popular control.
The Obligation Not To Mislead.  A second argument for the political significance of
institutional explanations of statutes can be derived from the premise that government should not
mislead the governed, at least in a democracy. Even if governments should legitimately keep secrets
in limited circumstances, the circumstances justifying government efforts to mislead the general
public are surely even more limited. An open refusal to divulge information is surely a less serious
affront to the public than the intentional propagation of falsehoods.  In other words, lying exhibits
an even greater disrespect for the status of citizens as sovereigns (and as autonomous beings entitled
to respect) than does refusing to supply an explanation at all.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art5
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Moreover, governmental deception can produce "falsified consent."  Democracy is17
legitimate only if citizens vote or otherwise consent based on their true preferences, rather than those
manufactured by government manipulation of information. Of course, citizens themselves do not
vote on most legislative proposals and exercise only indirect control over government — they vote
on representatives only periodically. Thus, citizens, in their capacity as sovereigns, do not ordinarily
directly rely on rationales provided by government. However, citizens are expected to influence
legislatures between elections by communicating with government officials. If citizens do not know
the reasons for governmental actions, they cannot effectively lobby government. Moreover, the true
explanations of legislative decisions may affect people's attitudes toward the structure of the
governmental process in general. For instance, the populace's perception of the reasons that generally
motivate a majority of legislators to act might shape their attitudes with respect to the desirability
of altering the campaign finance system or the rules governing lobbying. In short, where a
government has reasons for taking certain actions, that government has an obligation to avoid
misleading the public by misstating the rationale for its action.
Accordingly, the courts should not condone a legislative practice of acting for one reason,
but publicly proclaiming another. When private reasons differ from public ones, the public reasons
should receive more respect precisely because they are public. The act of proclaiming reasons should
be considered a public act that has significance beyond what it reveals about the secret motivations
of legislators. If government offers official justifications that vary from the real reasons for
government action, the official statements should be privileged over the actual purposes because of
their superior democratic pedigree.
Thus, if a legislature enacts a statute to protect a particular industry, but publicly presents it
as a consumer-protection statute, such deception should not be honored in the course of interpreting
the statute. If courts are to effectuate any purposes, they should effectuate the publicly-offered
purposes, not the private ones, even if the private rationale served as more of a motivating factor for
legislators. For example, to take a slightly modified version of the facts underlying Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co.,  suppose a legislature enacts a statute prohibiting optometrists from writing18
prescriptions for eyeglasses. The legislature may publicly justify the statute, in the legislative history,
as a public health measure, even if most legislators really wished to shield ophthalmologists from
competition. Disregarding the publicly-stated purpose and acting on the basis of the secret reasons
motivating the legislature furthers this legislative deceit. The court would not condone such deceit
if, instead, it acted on the basis of the publicly-stated justification. Thus, in interpreting that statute,
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a court should accord more weight to the public health justification than to the secret
anti-competitive justification.
This contrasts with the approach then-Professor (now Judge) Easterbrook recommends.
Easterbrook argues that the statutory text more likely captures the essence of the actual secret deal
between various groups interested in a piece of legislation. Any public explanation merely provides
a facade. Courts should honor the text because the actual secret intentions of the parties to the
legislation deserves more respect than their publicly-expressed intentions.   Analyzing the19
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. hypothetical from th Easterbrook perspective, the text of the statute
more likely reflects the actual legislative agreement, and thus the text, and not the publicly-stated
consumer protection purpose, deserves the focus of judicial attention. If an ambiguity arises, the
interpretation of the statute should not turn on the consumer protection rationale. Easterbrook's
approach should be rejected because even if institutional explanations are often merely a form of
deceit, Easterbrook's approach condones that deceit. While less true to legislators' actual intent,
interpretation that exalts public rationales would avoid condoning deceit.20
In short, the official explanation of legislative action should have a legal significance of its
own, apart from its value as evidence of legislators’ collective subjective intent. Whether or not the
public explanation is congruent with the legislators' private motivations, that official statement itself
is entitled to respect and can provide a basis for resolving difficult interpretive questions.
B. The Nature of the Duty to Explain
A legislative duty to explain finds support in several constitutional principles. The
proposition that legislatures must justify their actions follows from the constitutional principle that
“the people” are sovereign and the government is their agent. The proposition may also be implicit
in the Equal Protection Clause. Arguably, the Clause requires all government entities to justify the
distinctions they make between citizens. Indeed, some have argued that the courts should enforce
such a principle by requiring explicit justification of statutory classifications.  The Due Process21
Clause, too, may well provide a basis for an explanation requirement, the right to an explanation may
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qualify as one of the procedural protections implicit in due process.   The right to petition22
government may support such a requirement-as suggested earlier, citizens may find it difficult to
petition effectively if they lack the right to demand an explanation of a statute's justification.23
However, the duty I posit need not be viewed as an explicit constitutional mandate. Indeed,
the duty should operate differently from constitutional rules. Rather than authorizing invalidation
of statutes, it should operate as an underenforced constitutional norm   that merely affects the24
courts’ approach to statutory interpretation.
Courts refuse to directly enforce some constitutional principles because of institutional
competence concerns, but may encourage observance of those constitutional principles by the
manner in which they interpret statutes. For instance, the Court encourages sensitivity to the potential
unfairness of retroactive lawmaking by employing certain clear statement rules in interpreting
statutes. While Congress possesses broad power to enact retroactive legislation, the Court will not
construe a statute to operate retroactively unless Congress clearly so states its intent.  Indeed, courts25
sometimes leave unenforced explicit constitutional provisions, like the Republican Form of
Government Clause, because of institutional competence concerns. Yet, judicial nonenforcement
does not absolve Congress from its duty to comply with the Republican Form of Government Clause
or other unenforced constitutional provisions.
Two institutional competence concerns counsel against judicially-enforcing a reason-giving
requirement. First, requiring legislators to state their reasons for enacting statutes may lead to
intrusive judicial review of the quality of those reasons. Indeed, precisely such intrusive review
developed after Congress required agencies to provide "a concise general statement" of the "basis
and purpose" of each regulation promulgated.   Enforcement of this Administrative Procedures Act26
reason-giving requirement for informal rulemaking has led to rigorous review of the substance of
agency decisions and imposed a means-ends reasoning approach on agencies.   Second, the judiciary27
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can add little to the political process, which itself encourages legislators to proclaim reasons for
enacting statutes.   However, these institutional competence concerns about judicial enforcement28
of a reasons-giving requirement do not mean that Congress has any less of a duty to justify statutes.29
 
C. Objections
At least three objections can be raised to my claim that courts should view legislatures as
having a duty to explain statutes and interpret statutes in light of that duty. First, imposing such a
duty on legislatures equates the legislature with the judiciary, that is, it suggests that legislatures
should operate like courts. Because legislatures and courts serve different functions, imposing a
court-type duty of explanation upon legislatures is arguably inappropriate. Second, legislatures can
provide no explanations for statutes because institutional reasons for statutes almost never exist, i.e.,
group choice will almost always lack a coherent rationale. Third, even if legislatures have an
obligation to explain statutes, such explanations should be set forth in the statutory text itself, not
in other documents. Otherwise, legislatures can encroach upon the judicial power. I will address each
of these three objections in turn.
1. Turning Legislatures Into Courts
First, courts and legislatures arguably should make decisions on different bases — courts
should act on principle and legislatures should act on preferences or expediency. Reason-giving
serves to constrain the judicial decisionmaking process so that judges' own individual policy
preferences do not dominate their decisionmaking.   Legislatures, which should act on the basis of30
preferences, need no such constraint.  Indeed, if legislatures act on preferences, they may be unable
to satisfy any duty to explain. As Mark Tushnet observes, reason-giving requirements seek to
transform "legislators who are assumed in general to be creatures of will" into beings of reason.31
Such a concern may be dismissed. We require an element of reasoned decisionmaking even in the
legislative process.   Judicial decisions construing the Constitution require that statutes reflect the
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judgment of the legislature, not merely the legislature's unreasoned will or preferences. Statutes must
have some rational design.    Indeed, the Framers' design of the legislative and executive branches32
embodies the judgment that legislation should rest on some principled basis — the Framers
structured the electoral and legislative processes to induce enactment of rational laws.   In short,33
viewing legislatures as having an obligation to explain statutes does not compromise the legislative
function of resolving preferences.
2. Statutes Lack Purposes
A second criticism of the proposed duty of explanation, based on one of public choice
theory's teachings, rests upon the theory that group choice often cannot embody any coherent
underlying purposes. If group choice is inherently incoherent, then requiring legislatures to provide
explanations for statutes will require legislators to mislead the public, because the explanations
would falsely assert the existence of a coherent policy. If the legislature merely wishes to establish
the rights and obligations stated in the statutory text it enacts, then any explanatory text will
invariably state the "legislative purpose" less accurately than the statutory text itself.
The public choice view that statutes lack purposes should be rejected for two reasons:
(1) public choice theory assumes that the preferences of individual legislators do not change as a
result of their participation in the legislative process, and (2) public choice theorists' factual
predictions, namely that cycling will constantly afflict legislatures, have proven wrong.
First, public choice theory assumes that the preferences of representatives, which will
determine their votes on legislation, are fully formed and unchangeable before they participate in the
legislative process. Thus public choice theory assumes that no aspect of the legislative process—
such as hearings, mark-up sessions, floor debates, party caucuses, and informal contacts with other
members — will affect any legislator's preferences.
The assumption that preferences are exogenous to the legislative process, i.e., fully formed
and unchangeable before the legislative process begins, warrants skepticism. Indeed, many have
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argued that participation in the legislative process does affect the preferences of individual
legislators, and thus may affect their votes.
Second, the public choice prediction that the phenomenon of cycling majorities will bedevil
legislatures has proven erroneous. Cycles do not seem to occur frequently in the legislative process.
For instance, Congress rarely cycles through radically different alternatives.   Several theorists have34
identified other reasons for the rarity of cycles.
In particular, preferences may not be arrayed in ways that produce cycles because
representatives take into account the preferences of others and make judgments about which options
best advance the welfare of the country or, at the very least, the welfare of their own constituents.
(This contrasts with public choice theorists' assumption that representatives consider only the
subjective preferences of their constituents.) Often then, each representative votes not merely on the
basis of his constituents' subjective preferences (formed with only their own individual interests in
mind), but on a judgment about the welfare of his constituents (or perhaps even the country as a
whole). Theorists have suggested that judgments about welfare tend to produce preferences that are
less likely to result in cycles than preferences that reflect subjective desires, i.e., tastes.35
In addition, legislators may adjust their voting behavior in order to avoid cycles or prevent
undesirable outcomes. A group of legislators may decide to vote for their second-choice policy rather
than their first-choice in order to form a majority for the second-choice policy. They may do so
because they wish to avoid one of two undesirable results: (1) further cycling, or (2) the group's
selection of their third choice (as a result of the order of the voting). In this situation, the legislative
outcome is not random; it is not an accidental result that no one designed. The majority vote for the
winning policy reflects agreement on policy among the majority of the legislators, not just an
agreement on the text of the statute. 
For some, the above considerations may not provide a full answer to the public choice
critique.  Nevertheless, the considerations set forth above do provide a sufficient basis to entertain36
serious doubts about the public choice critique, and thus allow us to put aside that critique.
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3. Any Statement of Purposes Should Be Included in Statutory Text
A critic might argue that even if the legislature has a duty to provide a justification for
statutes, that justification must appear in the text of the statute. Certainly, many statutes contain
preambles, and those preambles can set forth statutory purposes and interpretive guidance.  However,
because words are indeterminate and legislatures cannot envision all future situations, legislatures
are entitled to provide rationales for statutes to guide courts interpreting those statutes, without
making such principles legally binding. Legislatures' lack of prescience means that legally-binding
explanations might not aid the courts in deciding a large number of cases, yet compel decisions that
the legislature did not desire.  In addition, at least the process of approving statutory commentary is
subject to a democratic process — legislators and chief executives can assent or dissent on the basis
of such commentary. The alternative, unelected interpreters like courts or administrative agencies
attempting to intuit legislative policies, is not democratic. The political branches of government
cannot overturn such judicial or administrative intuitions unless they can overcome inertia and pass
a second statute.
Some argue that allowing legislatures to provide nonstatutory interpretive guidance to courts
violates separation of powers principles by allowing legislatures to assume both legislative and
judicial powers.   But allowing legislatures to provide nonstatutory interpretive guidance when they37
enact statutes does not create the dangers that the Framers of the Constitution sought to avoid by
separating judicial power from legislative and executive powers.
There are two rationales for separating legislative and judicial powers.  First, preventing
legislators from exercising judicial powers preserves the rule of law, i.e., the impartial administration
of the law. Governments must enact general rules that apply to all citizens to ensure equal treatment
of all citizens. At the same time, governments must apply general rules to specific individual
controversies. General rules should be established by political branches of government accountable
to the electorate.  However, if these same politically accountable institutions also apply the general
principles to particular cases, they may begin to apply the rules arbitrarily in response to political
pressure. Thus, the legislature should act in generalities and courts should resolve specific
controversies.
Second, legislatures may not exercise judicial power because the rules of conduct should be
established before a citizen acts. The resolution of a particular case should not give the rulemaker
an opportunity to alter the relevant rules on a basis not disclosed before the person acted. Thus, the
separation of judicial and legislative power reflects concerns about retroactivity.
Provision of nonstatutory legislative guidance does not compromise the legitimate distinction
between legislative and judicial functions. Typically, the interpretive guidance provided by
legislatures in legislative history is broad-based, covering a wide range of cases, and is both
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promulgated and made publicly available before a controversial situation arises. Because legislative
history generally addresses broad categories of behavior, not the specific circumstances of particular
individuals, the provision of legislative guidance, in the form of legislative history, tends not to
implicate "rule of law" concerns.. Because legislatures promulgate nonstatutory interpretive guidance
before cases are adjudicated under the statute, and make such guidance available to those affected
by the statute as well as the public in general, judicial recognition of such nonstatutory legislative
guidance presents no retroactivity problem.
In any event, courts need not disregard legislative history to retain adjudicatory power. Even
though the judiciary currently accords weight to legislative history, the judiciary continues to apply
the law to particular factual controversies. Moreover, legislative history merely provides guidance,
the judiciary makes the ultimate decision as to: (1) whether the statutory text contains sufficient
ambiguity to justify reliance on legislative history, and (2) whether, even in light of the legislative
history, the statutory text can bear the construction that Congress's explanation suggests. Thus, the
legislature's provision of interpretive guidance separate from the statutory text does not
impermissibly encroach upon the judicial power.
II. New Textualists Versus Intentionalists
The duty to justify statutes now allows us to reexamine new textualism and intentionalism.
Ultimately, that reexamination will provide a basis for my public justification  approach.
A. New Textualism
Led by Justice Antonin Scalia, a group of judges and scholars, dubbed "the new textualists,"
have urged the courts to abandon the use of legislative history in interpreting statutes. As noted
earlier, textualism rests upon three premises. First, the only significant element of the legislative
process is the vote of each legislative chamber on proposals before it (and, of course, the signing or
veto of legislation by the chief executive). Second, legislators vote only on the text of the statute, not
any accompanying explanatory materials or their own subjective intent. Third, legislative majorities
rarely, if ever, share a common subjective intent regarding the statutes they enact. Though the new
textualist methodology has been challenged, as leading to stilted interpretations of statutes and
increasing the discretion of interpreters relative to lawmakers, these three premises have remained
unchallenged.
Nevertheless, the first two premises are problematic. The first premise ignores the
institutional nature of Congress. More particularly, it fails to recognize that Congress has an
institutional obligation to explain statutes and may act as an institution in ways other than holding
votes on legislation. The second premise conflicts with the normative principle that legislatures have
an obligation to explain statutes as well as enact them. Moreover, the third premise, while sound,
can be turned against the textualist — a majority of legislators will be no more likely to know the
precise language of a proposed bill and agree on its meaning than share one subjective intent.
However, the manner in which new textualism can avoid such an argument, by positing a duty to
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vote on statutes based upon their reasonable meaning, points the way to an alternative approach
founded upon legislators' obligation to base their votes upon the explanations of statutes as well as
their text.
1. New Textualist Premises
a. The Only Significant Action in the Legislative Process Is the Vote of Each Chamber on Legislation
New textualism, as well as public choice theory, assumes that the only significant element
of the legislative process is the vote of each legislative chamber on proposals before it. Early public
choice scholars viewed legislatures merely as arenas in which individual representatives assembled
and registered their preferences. The legislature merely aggregated those preferences. Public choice
scholars viewed the legislative process very much like the electoral process — the process by which
citizens "gathered" to express their preferences through voting. Accordingly, such theorists did not
view legislatures, like Congress, as institutions that existed apart from elected representatives. For
example, the early public choice models did not examine legislative committees, legislative
leadership structures, or behavioral norms.
This focus on individual representatives rather than the legislature as an institution requires
an exclusive focus on voting in legislative chambers. In a democracy, the preferences of all
representatives, like the preferences of all voters in elections, must be accorded equal weight; thus,
the majority rules. Representatives are equal only when they vote.    In the preliminaries to the vote,38
by contrast, members of a legislature wield very unequal influence. Indeed, under public choice
theory, those who frame issues for voting by the legislative chamber, such as drafters and
congressional committees, are "dictatorial" agenda-setters that possess the power to manipulate the
members of the chamber in ways that defeat democratic choice.  Accordingly, according special39
weight to the views of legislators who crafted the proposal submitted to the chamber would give
additional power to agenda-setters, whose control over the legislative agenda already ensures them
a degree of power inconsistent with democracy.  40
The focus on individual legislators, which entails disregarding all activities other than voting
in the legislative chamber, is problematic. Institutions matter. Congress is an institution greater than
the sum of 535 individual Representatives and Senators who serve in the House and Senate at any
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one time. In particular, analyzing the House of Representatives as 435 members taking a series of
votes that express their own individual preferences, without considering legislative debate, party
structure, the committee system, and institutional norms, is flawed and unrealistic. These structures
form an integral part of congressional behavior. Moreover, Congress must perform some functions
as an institution — institutional responsibilities separate from the responsibilities of individual
legislators. Of these institutional functions, two of the most relevant for our purposes are Congress's
acquisition of information and refinement of legislative proposals. Congress performs these
functions by delegating to committees the task of obtaining the information needed to make informed
judgments and formulating coherent proposals, subject to the approval of the entire legislative
chamber. Under this view, the work of congressional committees deserves special weight.    The41
duty to justify statutes is another institutional duty, and one that Congress routinely acquits by acting
as an institution.
b. A Vote Is Only a Vote on the Text of the Statute, Not the Explanatory Materials
New textualists argue that the text of a statute forms the only valid basis of statutory law and
that the subjective desires of legislators, even a majority of legislators, do not constitute binding
law.  If an opinion poll revealed a common desire among a majority of legislators, that desire would42
not constitute law. Rather, the new textualists note, the Founding Fathers designed the legislative
process so that even legislative majorities would encounter difficulty in transforming their subjective
intentions into binding statutory law. Desires become legally binding only when memorialized in a
statutory text that is approved by both the House and the Senate and then either signed by the
President or, if vetoed, approved by two-thirds of the House and the Senate. Legislative history lacks
legitimacy because it does not undergo this constitutionally-mandated enactment process.
However, the new textualists’ argument assumes that the vote on a statute is a vote only on
the statute's text. Committee reports do in a sense undergo the constitutionally-mandated
bicameralism and presentment processes. Committee reports can be, and often are, considered by
the various legislative actors (i.e., the House, the Senate, and the President), and could become the
focus of the various legislative actors' consideration of a proposed statute. Either branch of Congress
can refuse to pass a bill based on the explanatory statements in the legislative history. The President
can refuse to sign a bill whose text he finds acceptable if he objects to statements in the committee
report regarding the statute's meaning. Indeed, many have suggested that legislators are often more
likely to focus on the committee report and the bill manager's statements than the text of the statute.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art5
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Thus, the new textualists' argument really rests on their view of the meaning of legislative
votes. If the vote on a statute merely constitutes the approval of the text of the statute, then only the
text has undergone the constitutional process of bicameral approval and presidential consideration.
If the vote on the statute constitutes approval of the text and certain documents or statements
explicating the statute, then both the text and the expository materials have undergone the
constitutional process.
As I will argue below, the existence of an obligation to explain suggests that legislators
should  view their vote as an expression of assent or dissent to something more than the statutory
text.  If the legislature has an obligation to explain and provides an official explanation, the
legislators have a corresponding duty to vote based on those explanations. Thus, their votes should
constitute approval of both the statutory text and institutional explanatory materials, such as
committee reports and floor manager statements.
c. There Will Not Like Be One Subjective Intent Shared by a Majority of Legislators
New textualists argue that a majority of legislators will rarely share a subjective intent
regarding a statute's meaning. They rely on two cogent arguments. First, most legislators give little
thought to any particular statute, and certainly do not formulate a position on the numerous specific
issues that will confront courts and agencies in applying the statute.  Second, many members vote
on bills for reasons that have little or no relationship to their view of the bills' merits. (For example,
a member might vote for a statute in exchange for a colleague's vote on another measure.) Thus, with
respect to virtually any issue that arises under a statute, it is highly unlikely that a majority of the
enacting legislative body thought about the issue, voted based on the merits of the bill, and agreed
on the resolution of the issue.
However, precisely these same arguments can be made with respect to legislators'
consideration of the statutory text. Few, if any, legislators read all of a statute before they vote on
it; indeed, often they do not read any of it. Members will more likely rely on descriptions of the bill's
provisions, provided in the committee report or by members of their staff, than read the text of the
bill and form their own judgments about the text's meaning. In addition, many members may give
little thought to the text of the bill because they will vote based on the positions of others- those
colleagues or others they use as cues or referents. Moreover, even if members read the text, they
would probably understand the terms of the statute differently.
The new textualists do not appear to address these problems in great detail, but their response
can be surmised. Legislators' failure to form an understanding of the text (either because they do not
read the statute or because they follow others' cues) and their potentially divergent interpretation of
words are unimportant because each legislator has a duty to become aware of the text of the statute
and ascertain the meaning of that text to a reasonable person. Legislators have a duty to the populace
subject to the law, not just their own constituents, to enact determinate and easily understandable
statutes. If a legislator wishes a statute to reflect his subjective intent, and the text of the statute, as
interpreted by a reasonable person, does not reflect that intent, he must attempt to change the statute
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so that the statute conveys his intent to the reasonable reader. No legislator who votes for a statute
(even one who casts the decisive vote) could reasonably expect the courts to give the statute the
meaning he subjectively ascribes to it if that subjective understanding departs dramatically from the
customary meaning of the words used in the statute.  Because of the duties outlined above, the new
textualists essentially conclusively presume that all of the legislators knew the meaning the
reasonable person would attach to the statutory text and voted for or against the statute on that
basis.  With such a conclusive presumption based on duties arising out of the responsibilities of43
legislators, legislators' failure to read the statute or recognize the ordinary meaning of the statutory
text become failures to acquit their responsibilities rather than a problem that undermines new
textualist theory.44
This is a cogent response. However, as I will argue below, a similar argument supports the
recognition of the parts of legislative history that constitute the legislature's explanation of the
statute. In particular, because the public justification of statutes is important, courts should view
individual legislators as having a duty to contribute to that public justification and thus presume that
they vote on the basis of the text and the public justification.
2. New Textualist Methodology
The new textualist's methodology is simple. Courts should interpret statutes based on the
ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute and various rules of grammar and syntax, such as
the interpretive canon that a court must interpret a statute so as to give every word some effect. If
the ordinary meaning of the words and the syntax and grammatical devices do not yield an
interpretation, the court should fit the statute into the corpus of the law. Ordinarily, a court should
not refer to legislative history when interpreting a statute.
Stated alternatively, new textualists place no reliance on the enacting legislators' subjective
understanding of a statute, but rely only on the objective meaning of the text of the statute, i.e., the
understanding of the statute that the reasonable person would adopt. The only relevant text to be
construed in this objective manner is the text of the statute-the text of various elements of the
legislative history lack relevance because legislative history cannot create  legal obligations.
New textualism has undergone a fearsome counterattack. However, this counterattack rarely
contests the validity of the three premises underlying new textualism outlined above. Rather, critics
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argue that new textualism cannot yield results in difficult cases, regardless of its basis in
constitutional or political theory, and unduly increases the power of interpreters relative to
lawmakers.45
B. Intentionalism
Intentionalism requires the interpreter to construe a statute according to the "intent" of the
enacting legislature; the interpreter must determine which interpretations the enacting legislature
wanted it to adopt, or would have wanted it to adopt had the relevant issue been brought to the
legislature's attention.  Ascertaining this "legislative intent" entails not only examining statutory46
text, but, the statute's "legislative history" as well, because sometimes legislatures, like individuals,
use words that do not reflect their intentions.  In general, the courts seem to have adopted
intentionalism. I will discuss the assumptions underlying intentionalism and the unfortunate
methodological consequences intentionalism has produced.
1. Intentionalist Premises
Three premises that underlie intentionalism merit discussion. First, at least as seen by its
critics, intentionalism is individualistic and non-institutional; it ignores the role of legislative
institutions. Second, intentionalists do not view the vote on a statute as the approval of statutory text;
they view such a vote as an enactment of the subjective intent shared by a majority of the legislature.
Third, the intentionalist approach implicitly incorporates the belief that a majority of legislators will
often share an intent regarding many of the issues that arise (or at least would have had the issues
been broached). These assumptions are problematic, and lead to unfortunate methodological
consequences.
a. The Only Significant Action in the Legislative Process Is Each Chamber’s Vote on Legislation
In the view of its critics, intentionalism, like new textualism, focuses on legislatures as
collections of individuals rather than as institutions. Intentionalists aggregate the intentions of
individual legislators.  In particular, the intentions of a majority of the individual legislators form the
foundation of statutory law. The subjective intent that a majority of legislators either shared, or
would have shared had a particular issue arisen, constitutes the legislative intent that governs
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interpretation of the statute. Dean Paul Brest asserts that intentionalists not only examine the text of
a statute, but also accord each legislator an "intention-vote."  By counting these intention-votes, one47
can determine the legislative intent regarding a particular issue.
A focus on individual legislators rather than the legislature as an institution, in conjunction
with the democratic requirement of equality among legislators, would seem to demand that no one
legislator's intent be considered more important than that of any other.  However, such an approach
ignores institutional obligations and institutional actions. Indeed, the more cogent intentionalists
build a theory based upon the special institutional position of legislative committees. As an
institution, Congress delegates to committees the responsibility of determining legislative policies,
subject to the review and consent of the chamber as a whole.   Accordingly, the views of the48
committee and its representative in floor debates, i.e., the floor manager, which are in effect ratified
by approval of the committee's recommended statutory text, should receive special weight. However,
judicial practices go far beyond the approaches that this delegation-assent theory would endorse.
Courts, with the blessing of many scholars, use elements of legislative history that do not merit
recognition under a delegation-assent theory.   Moreover, delegation-assent theorists rarely offer a49
theoretical justification for imposing on legislators the obligation to either voice disagreement with
committee reports or consider themselves bound by them.  50
Intentionalism's focus on Congress as merely the sum of individual legislators creates
insurmountable methodological problems. Viewing legislatures as institutions avoids those
methodological problems.
b. A Vote on the Statute Is a Vote to Make the Subjective Intent of the Majority the Law
In contrast to the new textualists, intentionalists believe that the vote on the statute is a vote
to convert the subjective intent of the majority into law. The vote on a statute acts like a toggle
switch. If a majority of legislators share an intent, but the legislature does not enact a statutory
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provision memorializing that shared intent, the shared intent can have no legal effect. If the
legislature enacts a statute purporting to memorialize that intent, then that intent becomes binding
law, even if the ordinary meaning of the terms chosen to memorialize that intent do not reflect that
shared intent. When the interpreter concludes that the statute's "text cannot possibly reflect the actual
intent of Congress," because of a typographical error, for instance, legislative intent rather than the
text governs.   Thus, once the statute passes, intent, not text, is authoritative.  51 52
c. There Will Not Likely Be One Subjective Intent Shared by a Majority of Legislators
Intentionalism presumes that a majority of legislators will often share one subjective intent,
or would have, had a particular issue arisen. Intentionalist courts could use legislative intent to
resolve few cases if they did not believe that legislative majorities often share a purpose. The
argument over the importance of "intent" to interpretation would hold little significance if intent
existed as seldom as new textualists claim it does.
Intentionalists do not address the claims that few members think intently about bills and that
legislators' votes may bear little relation to their views of a statute's merits.   To the extent that they53
address such claims, they rely on the delegation-assent theory described earlier. Indeed, the
methodological problems faced by intentionalism result from intentionalists' pursuit of legislative
intent despite cogent arguments that a majority will rarely share a common intent.
2. The Intentionalists' Methodology
a. Using Legislative History to Find Intent
Intentionalists need a method for determining legislative intent — either legislators' actual
intent or the underlying attitudes that would have led legislators to agree upon a particular answer
if a particular issue had arisen. Traditionally, courts have relied upon both the ordinary meaning of
the statutory text and "legislative history" to discern legislative intent. Legislative history consisted
of a limited set of legislatively-produced documents, primarily, committee reports and floor debates.
That approach has evolved. Courts now use anything that can help them discern legislative intent,
including, in some jurisdictions, the testimony of legislators. This evolution results from
intentionalists' efforts to find legislative intent where none exists.
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Describing intentionalist methodology in terms that allow comparison with new textualist
methodology, intentionalist methodology's goal is subjective rather than objective. The intentionalist
seeks the subjective understanding of the members of the legislative majority rather than the
understanding of a reasonable person reading the statutory text.
b. The Problems
Unfortunately, using legislative history to determine the subjective intent of a majority of
legislators presents serious challenges. First, the use of legislative history to determine legislative
intent conflicts with the democratic principle that all representatives are equal.
The documents that comprise traditional legislative history contain the statements and views
of few members of Congress.  For any particular bill, most legislators do not participate in committee
proceedings and remain silent during floor debate. Thus, using legislative history to discern intent
introduces a bias toward the views of representatives who express their views in a certain narrow
range of documents. The views of the many legislators who expressed their views either in other
public fora (such as in political campaigns) or privately (to other legislators or staff members), or
who never expressed them, do not appear in the legislative history. The legislative history also will
not reflect the "intent" of members who did not formulate specific views before the vote on the
statute.
If the views of all legislators, those who expressed their views in other public fora, those who
expressed their views privately, those who did not express their views, and those who did not form
views, as well as those who expressed their views in the legislative history, are to be given one
intention-vote, the legislative history will surely provide unreliable evidence of the intent of the
majority of legislators. Rather, the intent set forth in the legislative history will be biased toward the
views of those who expressed their intent.
Second, as noted earlier, a majority of legislators will rarely share any intent.54
Third, we do not have and will likely never have sufficient information to determine the
subjective intent of legislative majorities. At best, legislative history provides indirect and inaccurate
information regarding the views of the two types of legislators that intentionalists should most wish
to learn about: (1) the typical majority voter, i.e., the legislators who made up the bulk of the
legislative majority; and (2) the swing voters, i.e., the legislators who cast the deciding votes. Worse
yet, the legislative that history may not provide any explanation of some legislative compromises.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art5
  Nicholas Zeppos argues that legislative intent resembles the intent of individuals or organizations, to55
which courts regularly attach legal consequences.  Zeppos, supra note 41, at 1344-47.  Zeppos argues that the
methodology used in determining legislative intent should resemble that used in determining intent in other contexts.
 See Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There, in The Complete Illustrated56
Works of Lewis Carroll 103-04 (Edward Guiliano ed., 1982).
-23-
c. Attempted Solutions
The courts and "intentionalist" scholars have pursued two basic approaches in addressing the
inadequacy of traditional legislative history as a tool for determining the subjective intent of
legislative majorities. One approach expands the legislative record or, more radically, transforms
statutory interpretation from an exercise in interpreting text into a fact- finding exercise. A second
approach involves acknowledging the inaccuracy of traditional legislative history but refusing to
consider additional information because of countervailing values. The first approach will fail; the
second is arbitrary.
The first approach seeks to increase the judiciary's sophistication in discerning legislative
intent. Courts have, over time, expanded "the record" of legislative action, considering an
increasingly wider range of materials. Initially, courts referred primarily to statements in floor
debates and committee reports. While these remain the preferred sources, courts now refer to a wider
range of documents, including transcripts of mark-up sessions, testimony at congressional hearings,
and documents prepared by non-legislators. Some have recommended further expansion of the
legislative record, calling for the publication of documents that currently remained unpublished.
More significantly, the California courts accept sworn statements from legislators regarding
legislative intent.55
This first approach of expanding the legislative record and reformulating statutory
interpretation as fact-finding will fail. While it may reduce the bias toward the views of those who
spoke as opposed to those who did not, such an approach will surely not eliminate that bias. Nor will
it solve the problems caused by legislators' failure to give detailed thought to statutes and their
frequent decisions to vote for reasons unrelated to their understanding of a statute. Such an approach
does not even solve the lack of information problem. Though courts have expanded the sources
recognized as legislative history, they ultimately, like Alice and the Red Queen,   running harder56
and harder yet making no progress toward their goal, seem no closer to discerning actual legislative
intent.
A second approach involves acknowledging the inadequacy of legislative history. Even if
traditional legislative history does not reflect the subjective intent of the majority, countervailing
concerns require courts and agencies to limit their attempts to discern true subjective intent. For
instance, a desire to enhance citizens' ability to ascertain the law can justify limiting the inquiry into
legislative intent. The more sophisticated the judicial search for subjective legislative intent, the
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more citizens will have to consult numerous documents, some of which may even be unavailable.57
Concerns about the reliability of the evidence of intent could also justify limiting the inquiry into
legislators' subjective intents — unofficial sources of information regarding legislative intent,
particularly legislator testimony, may be too unreliable.
Ultimately, this second approach, limiting the inquiry into subjective intent based upon
competing values, seems arbitrary. The approach requires the judiciary to view subjective intent as
the law, but to adopt a technique that clearly will not uncover that subjective intent. In addition, the
approach will invariably require the courts to make questionable distinctions between documents that
can be considered and those that cannot. Moreover, the dangers posed by the use of various
categories of documents probably varies greatly depending upon the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the particular statute being interpreted.
In short, because intentionalism focuses on legislators as individuals, and thus requires the
interpreter to ascertain an intent shared by a majority of legislators, intentionalism faces serious
methodological problems. The result has largely been an expansion of the materials courts consider
in interpreting statutes. Ultimately, however, the courts have not demonstrated an ability to
convincingly identify any actual intent of a majority of legislators. Rather, the conclusions about
legislators' intentions tend to reflect judges' policy views more than any credible factual
determination of legislators' subjective policy views.
III. The Public Justification Approach
The public justification approach rests upon three premises. First, legislatures are institutions,
not merely aggregations of individual legislators. As an institution, the legislature has obligations
apart from those of its individual members and can act without a vote of the full membership.
Second, the vote on a statute is a vote on both its text and its justification as presented by the
institution. Third, even though a majority will not likely share subjective intentions, legislators have
an obligation to both understand the ordinary meaning of the statutory text and learn the institutional
explanation of the statute. The public justification approach seeks the reasonable meaning of words
rather than subjective intentions of those who approved the words. It is an "objective" rather than
a "subjective" approach, but expands the text that must be interpreted to include the institutional
justifications for statutes as well as their text.
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A. Premises of the Public Justification Approach
1. Congress Has Duties and Can Act as an Institution
Congress is an institution rather than merely a collection of individuals. As an institution,
Congress has obligations in addition to the duties of each of its individual members. A duty to
provide an institutional explanation of a statute is one such obligation, and that obligation makes
some legislative history legally significant. Moreover, Congress can act as an institution in ways that
do not involve formal votes of the full membership of the legislative chamber. Thus, other aspects
of the legislative process besides floor votes should be afforded legal significance. In particular,
committee actions deserve recognition.
a. Institutional Duties
The public choice and intentionalist approaches suggest a focus on individual legislators that
ignores the duties of the legislature as an institution. The individual legislator may have obligations,
such as the obligation to represent the preferences of his constituents or to oppose unconstitutional
legislation, but Congress does not. For instance, we might believe that voters have a duty to vote
against a repressive or unconstitutional referendum measure, yet not view "the electorate" as having
a collective duty to reject such referenda. Only with difficulty can one view the electorate as an
institution with such collective obligations.
Congress should be viewed as an institution with obligations separate from those of
individual legislators. For instance, Congress also has a duty to enact comprehensible laws. Congress
also has a duty to oversee the operations of the executive branch and to inform the public of
executive branch misconduct.58
By focusing upon individual legislators, one could conclude that the only obligation to
explain statutes is that of each individual legislator to discuss his actions with his constituents. While
such explanations might aid the legislator's constituents in deciding whether to re-elect him, they
may be useful for little else. If every member of the legislature presents his own reasons for assenting
to a legislative proposal, or even if we look at varied statements of many legislators, we still may
lack a sense of the legislature's rationale for adopting the statute.  59
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A rationale that can fairly be ascribed to the legislature as a collective entity would be far
more useful. We will have one relatively coherent rationale rather than numerous varying rationales.
Moreover, collective rationales are at least likely to have a continuing influence on further legislative
efforts that go beyond the present membership of the legislative body.
b. Institutional Actions
Congress undoubtedly acts as an institution when it enacts statutes. However, Congress can
act even when its full membership is not voting on the floor of the relevant legislative chamber.
Legislatures often delegate work to committees. For instance, legislative oversight, an institutional
function, is conducted by committees rather than by floor vote.  More importantly for our purposes,
legislatures often establish committees to analyze and develop legislative proposals, including
justifications for those proposals, and provide information regarding those proposals to the
legislative body. Thus the members of Congress have established a system in which standing
committees develop information regarding prospective bills in certain subject areas, craft particular
legislation, and then provide a rationale for the committee proposals. Accordingly, Congress, as an
institution, produces explanations of statutes even though the text of those explanations arguably
never become subject to a formal vote.
However, while some actions taken by small groups of legislators or individual legislators
count as institutional actions, others should not. An action should qualify as "institutional" only if
it satisfies three criteria. First, the action must be made known to all members of the legislature.
Second, the action must be subject to reversal by the full membership. Third, members must view
the action as authoritative — something other than the expression of an individual or a group.
In short, legislatures have institutional obligations. Legislatures owe the populace not merely
clear statutory commands, but a public justification of those commands. As we shall see, this public
justification obligation, and its fulfillment through committee reports or other documents, legitimates
legislative history without reliance upon the flawed concept of legislative intent.
2. A Vote on a Statute Is a Vote on the Text and the Explanatory Materials
The concept of public justification offers a novel view of the duties of the individual
legislator as well as the duties of the legislature as a whole. Collective actions and responsibilities,
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such as those of a legislature, have meaning only if individual members of the collective have duties.
Thus, the responsibility of the legislature structures the responsibilities of individual legislators. I
will first discuss the impact that the legislature's duty to provide understandable commands has upon
individual legislators' responsibilities. I will then discuss the implications that the duty of public
justification outlined above has for the responsibilities of individual legislators when they participate
in debate and voting.
A legislature can satisfy its duty to provide understandable commands to citizens only if each
legislator has a corresponding obligation in casting his vote. That corresponding obligation consists
of expressing assent or dissent, in the form of his vote, to the meaning of the proposed statute (i.e.,
the command) in customary English usage. An example will illustrate the point. Assume a ten
member legislative body, in which each of the ten legislators use the term "motor vehicle" to
communicate different concepts, none of which relate to the customary meaning of the term "motor
vehicle." A statute passed by such a legislature prohibiting “motor vehicles” from entering a park
would mean nothing if the legislators' only obligation were voting based on their own subjective use
of the term “motor vehicles.” There would be no "meeting of the minds"— each legislator could
insist that the courts interpret the language as she understood it because she had no duty to consider
the ordinary meaning of the statutory text. The statute could have meaning, regardless of the
legislators' differing understandings of the term "motor vehicle," if legislators had a duty to assent
or dissent, in the form of their votes, to the statute's customary meaning. Even if no legislator
understood the term "motor vehicles" to mean motorized means of transport, the term "motor
vehicle," as used in the statute, could be given that meaning. Such an interpretation would be
justified because the legislators should have based their vote on the customary meaning of the
statutory text, even if they did not. In short, the legislators constructively assented to banning
"motorized means of transport," and only such objects, from the park. Such constructive assent
makes legislators' actual intent in assenting irrelevant. The legislator who objects to a court honoring
the customary meaning of the statutory language rather than that legislator's subjective use of that
language can be told that he should have either sought to amend the statute or voted against it. His
decision to vote for the statute based on his own subjective belief was irresponsible.
Now the implications of the legislature's duty to provide public justification can be explored.
Because under the public justification approach the duty of the legislature is broader, the duties of
each individual legislator are correspondingly broader. The legislature has an obligation to provide
a public justification. Each legislator has an obligation to participate in the creation of both the
statutory text and the public justification. The legislature can provide a public justification only if
individual members vote on the basis of that public justification. Thus, once that public justification
is promulgated, each legislator has a duty to express assent or dissent, by means of her vote, to both
the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the statute and the public justification provided for it. If
a legislator votes for a statute while holding a subjective view of the statute's rationale that differs
from the public justification offered by the legislature, she is not entitled to have a court honor her
subjective view of the statute's rationale any more than she would be entitled to have a court honor
her subjective use of the terms in the text of the statute. Rather, the legislator who asserts that her
own subjective view of the rationale should govern the statute's interpretation can be told that she
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should have expressed her objection to the rationale provided by the legislature. Her duty as a
legislator makes her act of voting for the statute without expressing her disagreement with the
publicly — offered rationale irresponsible-the statute need not be interpreted under the assumption
that legislators act so irresponsibly.
The duty of the legislator to express assent or dissent regarding each statute's public
justification now provides the missing element to the argument of the intentionalists who pursue a
delegation-assent approach. Under the delegation-assent argument, legislators assent, by voting for
a statute, to the explanation of the statute provided by the reporting committee. The argument rests
on a kind of constructive assent. A member's vote constitutes assent to the legislative history,
whether or not the member actually intended to assent to that legislative history. If the individual
legislator has no responsibility for the legislative history, and the legislature has no duty to provide
public justification, it is difficult to construe the legislator's vote as constructive assent to anything
other than the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute. The member should have felt no
obligation to disavow the legislative history.  60
The public justification concept provides the basis for constructive assent — each legislator
has a responsibility to express assent or dissent to both the customary English usage of the words in
the statute and the explanation of the statute. Given such a duty, one could say that the legislator
should have responded to the public justification provided and that his failure to do so, whether
because of agreement, indifference, or inattention, constitutes constructive assent to that explanation.
3. There Will Not Likely Be One Subjective Intent Shared by All Legislators, But So What?
The strength of the new textualist attack on the concept of "legislative intent" rests upon the
cogency of the new textualist assertion that a subjective intent shared by a majority of legislators
rarely exits. Under the public justification approach, the validity of that new textualist premise can
be acknowledged but ignored.
With respect to most statutes, as noted earlier, it is unlikely that a majority of legislators were
aware of the text of the statute and shared a common understanding of its language. The new
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textualists could disregard this problem, we presumed, because of their conception of legislators'
duties — legislators have a duty to read the words of the statute and understand their customary
English usage. Thus, legislators' votes signify their assent to the text in the customary English usage,
regardless of whether they had actually read the statute and actually understood the customary
English usage of the words employed.
Under the public justification approach, a similar argument can be advanced with respect to
the legislative history that comprises the statute's public justification. The absence of a shared
subjective intent is unimportant. A public justification is available to each legislator, as is the text
of the statute. Just as each legislator has a duty to make herself aware of the statutory text and its
meaning in ordinary English usage, under the public justification approach each individual legislator
also has a duty to make herself aware of the public justification offered for the statute, and to vote
on the basis of that public justification. Accordingly, if the legislator votes for the statute without
dissenting from the public justification, she should be viewed as constructively assenting to that
public justification. The legislator who fails to familiarize herself with the public justification for a
statute, or fails to challenge a public justification that she privately considers inaccurate, has not
acquitted her duty as a legislator. Her actual views of the statute's rationale are irrelevant because she
failed to meet her obligation to address the statute's public justification.  61
B. Public Justification Methodology
The public justification approach requires the interpreter to examine both the statute's text
and public justification. Commentary outside the public justification should not be considered
binding.  The text of the statute must be interpreted in light of the public justification provided.62
Thus, although the public justification should be honored by the court, it should receive less weight
than the statutory text.
The court must identify the materials that constitute the statute's public justification. Because
this public justification reflects an institutional approach, the materials that comprise the public
justification must be attributable to the legislature as an institution. As suggested above, courts
should employ three criteria to determine whether particular material is attributable to Congress.
First, only material available to all legislators may be considered a part of the public justification.
Each legislator has a right to participate in the development of the public justification, so each must
have access to that justification. If some members lack such access, the justification is not that of the
institution, but of the limited group that has access. Moreover, a member can have no duty to respond
to statements regarding a statute if he lacks access to those statements. Reports of congressional
committees and statements made on the House and Senate floor satisfy this requirement. Committee
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reports must be available to all members of Congress, and all members may attend floor proceedings
or obtain a copy of the Congressional Record. On the other hand, documents not readily available
prior to floor vote, such as party caucus documents, transcripts of committee mark-up sessions,
transcripts of committee hearings, and public speeches outside Congress, do not merit recognition
as part of the public justification. Treating such documents as expressions of Congress, rather than
as expressions of individuals or groups, would be inappropriate.
Second, material may become a part of a statute's public justification only if members can
respond to the material before casting their votes. Documents that members can amend during floor
proceedings would obviously satisfy this requirement. Presumably, however, in most legislatures
members can amend only statutory text during floor proceedings. For instance, reports filed by
congressional committees are not subject to amendment. However, even an unamendable document
should qualify as an institutional document so long as members can disavow the document, in whole
or in part, before voting. Though members cannot formally amend a committee report, a legislative
majority can disavow committee reports in several ways. Members may certainly express
disagreement with the committee report on the floor of the legislature. Ultimately, however, this
second requirement excludes little except post-enactment materials, because during debates members
of Congress can express disagreement with any document that discusses the statute.
Third, only material considered authoritative by the legislators themselves should gain
recognition as a part of a statute's public justification. Material that legislators themselves
customarily rely upon as an exposition of statutory meaning (particularly when casting their votes)
meets this standard; material that members regard as an expression of the views of one particular
legislator or group of legislators do not. Committee reports and floor manager statements have
attained such authoritative status. Senators and Representatives rely upon committee reports and
floor manager statements as authoritative expositions of statutory meaning. If a member wants an
authoritative explanation of a statute, he (or his staff) consults the committee report or questions the
floor manager during the debate on the bill. Congress delegates to committees the task of both
reporting statutory text, in the form of a bill, and providing an explanation of the bill that members
can consult in deciding how to vote. Thus, a committee report is required by the rules of the House
and customarily provided in the Senate. Conference reports must be published in the Congressional
Record and made available to each Senator or Representative before they vote on the corresponding
bill. Indeed, members have come to rely on committee reports so heavily that they often do not
consult the text of the statute.63
Moreover, members of Congress surely realize that courts, members of the public, and
agencies find such documents authoritative. On the other hand, statements made at hearings, made
outside Congress, or set forth in party caucus documents do not appear to have gained the same
respect. They are seen as expressing only the views of individual members, not that of Congress as
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an institution. This reasoning may appear somewhat circular — the public, administrative agencies,
and legislators may have begun to rely on committee reports and floor manager statements because
courts began to rely on such materials, and in turn the widespread reliance on such material is now
being used to justify continued judicial reliance upon it. However, even assuming that judicial
practice produced widespread reliance on such documents, Congress could have expressed
disapproval of the trend or even enacted a statute precluding consideration of legislative history. So
while the courts may have provided the initial impetus for reliance upon committee reports and floor
manager statements, the continued reliance upon such documents may be attributed to, at a
minimum, Congress's acquiescence.
Ultimately, the categories of material considered part of the institutional justification of
statutes must be limited so that legislators' duty to respond to that justification does not become
overwhelming. We should not require members of Congress to review and publicly comment upon
numerous documents on pain of being found to have assented to all the statements therein, because
acquitting such a duty would deprive members of time needed to engage in other legislative
activities. However, if the legislative process is to be a discussion of policy rather than a registration
of preferences, legislators should have a duty to review the limited number of documents discussing
statutory rationales produced by authorities within the institution.
With respect to the United States Congress, the "public justification" of statutes consists of:
(1) committee reports (of both conference and standing committees), (2) statements of a bill’s floor
manager, and (3) the statement of a sponsor of an amendment, when that amendment has not been
the subject of committee consideration. The final category takes into account situations in which the
Senate or the House adopts an amendment proposed by a member that changes the bill recommended
by the relevant committee.
Thus, members of Congress have a duty to familiarize themselves with the explanations
contained in these three types of documents. They also have a duty to object to the explanations with
which they disagree. However, requiring every member who disagrees with a statement in the
documents comprising the “public justification” to express that disagreement is unnecessary and
unwise. If several legislators disavow the offending statement, a member who agrees with them
should not need to express his disagreement with the public justification as well. Such a requirement
would needlessly extend debate. Thus, if several legislators argue that the statute's rationale is
broader, narrower, or simply different than that identified in the public justification, other members
need not add their voices in support.  64
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However, such an expression of disagreement will probably provoke a discussion and clearer
resolution of the issue. The floor manager may provide a more complete explanation of the statute.
That explanation may convincingly demonstrate that the floor manager's initial statement or the
committee report provides the best explanation of the statute. Alternatively, the legislative body
might consider amending the text of the bill.
In short, a court interpreting a federal statute should interpret the text in light of committee
reports, floor manager statements, and sponsor statements, but abandon reliance on apparently
relevant aspects of those documents if floor debate reveals a substantial controversy regarding those
aspects of the documents. A court should not consider itself bound by other aspects of legislative
history (although these other aspects of legislative history may be used as persuasive authority if a
court, after examining the text in light of the public justification, concludes that the statute is
ambiguous).
This approach is objective, relying on the customary meaning of text. In this respect, it
resembles the new textualist approach and differs from the intentionalists' subjective approach.
However, under the public justification approach, the relevant text is expanded to include not just
the text of the statute, but also the text of certain additional documents. A recognition of the duty of
the legislature to explain statutes and of the individual legislators to react to the public justifications
justifies this expansion of the relevant text.
IV. Application of the Public Justification Approach
Examination of two ongoing interpretive debates further illustrates the usefulness of the
public justification approach. The first debate involves judicial interpretation of unexplained
statutory provisions that appear to address controversial issues. The second involves application of
general statutory language to situations that the enacting legislature did not contemplate.
A. The Dog That Did Not Bark
Supreme Court Justices have debated whether congressional silence regarding a questionable
application of an ambiguous statute justifies limiting the reach of the statute. The text of a statute,
read literally, may appear to require a questionable treatment of an issue even though nothing in the
applicable legislative history addresses the issue.
An amendment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 presented the Court with such a situation
in Chisom v. Roemer.  Initially, the statute prohibited any "voting qualification or prerequisite to65
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure" that resulted in a denial of the right to vote on account
of race or color. The Supreme Court construed the provision to mean that plaintiffs must prove
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intentional discrimination to establish a Voting Rights Act violation.  Congress then amended the66
Voting Rights Act, adding section 2(b), to allow plaintiffs to establish a Voting Rights Act violation
merely by proving the discriminatory effect of a statute, without showing discriminatory intent.
Specifically, section 2(b) provided that plaintiffs could establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act
by proving that members of a minority group "have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate . . . to elect representatives of their choice."
The Chisom Court had to determine whether the word "representatives" included candidates
for elective judicial offices, and thus whether litigants could rely upon the section 2(b) "effects" test
to challenge rules governing judicial elections. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, argued that
the word "representative" encompassed all elected officials, even judges. He offered several reasons
for his conclusion, but only one merits discussion here. Justice Stevens argued that Congress would
not have distinguished judicial elections from all other elections without noting that intent or without
many members of Congress expressing opposition.  In particular, before the amendment of the67
Voting Rights Act, identical standards governed judicial and non-judicial elections; the ambiguous
term "representative" should not be viewed as requiring the standards for judicial and non-judicial
elections to diverge. In setting forth his reasoning, Justice Stevens referred to a Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle story in which Doyle's famous detective, Sherlock Holmes, determined the murderer's identity
by noting that the victim's dog did not bark on the night of the murder.  In that story, Holmes relied68
upon the dog's silence to infer that the murderer was someone with whom the dog was familiar.
Congress's silence regarding the divergence of the standards for judicial and non-judicial elections,
when amending the Voting Rights Act, had significance, just as the silence of the "dog that did not
bark" had significance in the Holmes story.
Justice Scalia objected to Justice Stevens's reasoning. First, he argued, Justice Stevens's
argument relied on the erroneous proposition that "Congress cannot be credited with having achieved
anything of major importance by simply saying it, in ordinary language, in the text of a statute
'without comment' in the legislative history."  The word "representative" clearly did not include69
judges, and Congress did not have to "call its shot," that is, explain the significance of the textual
change it was making. To Justice Scalia, the text of the statute clearly provided different standards
for non-judicial elections, in which "representatives" are chosen, and judicial elections, in which
officials who do not "represent" constituents are chosen. Second, Justice Scalia argued, one cannot
assume that everything of significance will be noted in legislative history or spark legislative debate.
In several cases, the Justices have debated the propriety of interpreting statutes based on the
absence of an express announcement of an intent to change the law and a lack of controversy over
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a provision.   When using this "dog that did not bark" approach, the Court implicitly envisions70
legislative intent as a fact awaiting discovery. Thus, the Court derives its most prominent analogy
for such reasoning from the technique used by detectives in attempting to determine a fact, namely
the identity of a murderer. For the Court, legislators' apparent belief that they need not explain a
particular statutory change and the absence of controversy about the statute's meaning provide two
"clues" to legislators' subjective understanding of the statute. Any inferences from legislative silence
rest on certain assumptions about legislative behavior, namely that when the legislature takes
significant action it will explain the significance of its actions, or at least individual legislators will
contest the controversial action during legislative consideration of the relevant bill. Of course, even
assuming that this is invariably true, the Court would nevertheless need to determine whether the
issue before it is one that members of Congress believed significant.
Viewing arguments based on Congress's silence as factual is problematic; the Supreme Court
rarely cites any facts in support of its conclusion that a particular change would either have been
explained in the legislative history or provoked controversy. Clearly, not every change that a statute
makes requires explanation or provokes discussion; members of Congress have limited time to
debate issues. Thus, to draw inferences from Congress's failure to explain or the lack of legislative
controversy, the Court must conclude that the particular change in the law, allegedly made merely
by the enactment of certain statutory text, was sufficiently salient to members of Congress that it
would have led them to explain their actions or provoked discussion. However, probative evidence
of Senators' and Representatives' views of the significance of a particular change rarely exists. Thus,
the Court most often merely asserts, without citing any evidence, that if Congress had envisioned
a particular interpretation of the statutory language there would have been some indication of such
an intent in the legislative history, or at least some debate. It is almost as if Sherlock Holmes had
inferred the identity of the murderer from the victim's dog's silence knowing only that ordinarily the
dog's master familiarized the dog with important people in his life, surmising that one of the suspects
was probably someone the master considered important, and reasoning that therefore the dog knew
that particular suspect. This is hardly the sort of inference Holmes was likely to draw, at least without
obtaining more specific evidence.
Justice Scalia's challenge to such reasoning is reminiscent of his challenge to the use of
legislative history in general. He argues that changing the text of a statute should suffice to change
the law. Interpretation based on silence is flawed, argues Justice Scalia, because due process does
not require that "legislation . . . be supported by committee reports, floor debates, or even
consideration, but only by a vote."  71
Justice Stevens's and Justice Scalia's opposing positions correspond to the general views of
intentionalists and new textualists outlined earlier in this Article. The approach I suggest rests on the
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principle that legislatures should justify statutes and that courts should interpret unexplained
legislative actions cautiously. The Scalia approach is deficient because it does not acknowledge the
role of public justification. Even though the Due Process Clause does not create a judicially
enforceable requirement that legislatures provide a justification for statutes, legislatures should (and
do) explain statutes, and courts should interpret statutes in light of this unenforced legislative
obligation. Thus, courts should accord significance to the absence of any assertion that a statute
covers a controversial situation when interpreting ambiguous statutory language.
However, the Stevens approach is deficient in characterizing interpretive questions as factual
issues involving "legislative intent." The deficiencies of the "legislative intent" concept have been
discussed earlier. Instead of attempting to determine whether members of Congress would have
viewed a potential application of the statute as sufficiently controversial to warrant vocal opposition
or explanation in the legislative history, the Court should determine whether a particular application
of the statute is questionable given its own view of the public justification offered for a statute and
the corpus of the law. If the proposed application of the statute is questionable  and no mention is72
made of such an application of the statute in the "public justification" (committee reports, statements
of floor managers, and statements of sponsors), then the Court may appropriately construe the statute
to exclude that situation.
Thus, in Chisom, the Court properly considered Congress's failure to suggest that voting
rights standards should diverge for judicial and non-judicial elections. However, the Court erred in
relying upon some unsupported (and ultimately probably insupportable) inference about legislative
intent. The Court should have considered whether the more general purposes of the Voting Rights
Act would have been served by such a distinction, and whether other federal voting rights laws
distinguished judicial and non-judicial elections. The Court may have concluded, after pursuing such
an analysis, that distinguishing judicial and non-judicial elections would not have furthered the
elimination of discrimination in voting and that any countervailing principles (such as the principle
of preserving local governments' freedom to establish the voting rules) apply no differently in
judicial and non-judicial elections. The Court could then have concluded that judicial and non-
judicial elections should not be distinguished, based on ambiguous statutory language, unless
Congress at least sets forth such a policy in its justification of the statute.
In any event, legislative justification of statutes is important, and courts ordinarily should not
conclude that Congress has commanded a significant change in the law without explanation. The
requirement of justification supports the requirement that Congress "call its shot" when statutory
language is ambiguous.
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B. Holy Trinity: General Words with Unexpected Applications
The approach presented in this Article may also change our view of the interpretive enterprise
in situations where a statute uses general words that extend beyond any justification offered for the
statute. Holy Trinity Church v. United States  provides a classic example of this type of problem.73
The statute at issue prohibited anyone from assisting or encouraging the immigration of any
foreigner who had, before immigrating, entered into a contract to "perform labor or services of any
kind."   The United States sued Holy Trinity Church, which had hired an English cleric as it rector74
and pastor. The central issue was whether such employment constituted the "performance of labor
or services of any kind" under the immigration statute. As the Court noted, the text of the provision
seemed to apply to such employment. However, the Court focused on congressional intent, asserting
that it did not "think Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that" between
a church and a rector.  The Court explained: "It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the75
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers."  The Court held that the statutory phrase "labor or services of any kind"76
meant only manual labor, relying on its general knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
statute's enactment, the problems that prompted Congress to act, and the statute's legislative history,
which focused on immigrants who engaged in physical labor. The Court noted that the relevant
Senate committee realized that the text of the statute could be read to include even those immigrants
who did not engage in manual labor and refused to amend the statute to limit its reach to manual
laborers. The Committee had explained that it did not wish to delay the bill's enactment by redrafting
it and expressed its confidence that the courts would interpret the bill to bar only manual laborers.
The Court also expressed concern about the statute's impact on religious freedom were the statute
interpreted literally, and said it did not believe Congress meant to inhibit the practice of religion.77
Though no Justice dissented in Holy Trinity, Justice Anthony Kennedy criticized the Holy
Trinity Court's approach in his opinion in Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice.78
Justice Kennedy argued that legislative materials possess no authority. He also asserted that the
judicial practice of "rummag[ing] through" legislative history does not further "democratic
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exegesis."  Finally, analogizing judicial efforts to ascertain legislative intent to a seances,  Kennedy79 80
argued that determinations of legislative intent are generally so deficient and based on so little
evidence that a court's conclusion as to legislative intent likely reflects the views of the judges rather
than those of the enacting legislature.
How are we to approach this dispute between those who believe in limiting  general words
by the legislative history and those who do not? Justice Kennedy offers telling criticisms of the use
of legislative history to the extent that it is used to determine the actual subjective intent of a majority
of the enacting legislature. The factual basis for a conclusion that most representatives in the
Congress that enacted the immigration bill intended the statute to apply only to manual laborers does
not seem fully convincing and may reflect the views of the judges more than any serious factual
inquiry.   Certainly, historians, journalists, archaeologists, or others concerned with history, would81
find unpersuasive the factual inquiry conducted by the Holy Trinity Court.
On the other hand, the new textualist approach, as exemplified by Justice Kennedy's
argument in Public Citizen, inappropriately discounts the importance of public justification. Because
a majority vote on the general text is not the only relevant part of the legislative process, Kennedy's
view is too restrictive. The public justification for the statute is an appropriate source to use in
determining the scope of the statute. Judges must acknowledge that they are not conducting a factual
inquiry into "intent" when attempting to construe a statute. Rather, courts must determine the proper
scope of the statute in light of the "public justification" provided for it. The scope of the statute will
broaden or contract depending on the public justification. However, given the use of general
language in a statute's text, such a statute clearly cannot be interpreted to cover only the specific
matters or situations addressed in the public justification. Thus judges will have to acknowledge
discretion; they will have to admit that their interpretation is not merely the one they are forced to
accept by some "legislative intent," but rather one that is chosen based on the court's interpretation
of the text of the statute and the public justification provided.
V.  New Textualists’ Instrumentalist Challenge to Legislative History
The arguments discussed above have focused on an intrinsic inquiry, namely which approach
to statutory interpretation produces the most legitimate interpretation of statutes. Traditionally,
debates about statutory interpretation has focused on an intrinsic inquiries.  Legal theorists asked the
following types of questions: Should courts primarily act as agents of the legislature, seeking to
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effectuate its intent?  Should courts view statutory text as the only legitimate source of law?  Should
courts acknowledge the discretion they possess and proceed accordingly, by giving authoritative
weight to neither the statutory text nor their perception of legislative intent? Recently, however,
scholars increasingly have viewed interpretive techniques as tools to shape the legislative process
— an instrumental approach that seeks to justify particular interpretive techniques by their potential
salutary effect on the legislative process.82
New textualism is a part of this instrumentalist trend.  In addition to new textualists’ intrinsic
argument that only statutory text should create legal obligations and that legislative history does not
provide a legitimate source of legal obligations, new textualists assert four instrumentalist arguments
for disregarding legislative history.  First, new textualists argue that reliance upon legislative history
discourages legislatures from enacting clear, easily-understood statutes.  Because legislators can use83
legislative history to address ambiguities in statutory text, they lack the incentive to eliminate those
ambiguities.  New textualists explicitly acknowledge their desire to compel more precise
congressional drafting.84
Second, new textualists have expressed concern about the unreliability of legislative history
as an expression of Congress's actual desires, noting that legislative minorities can manipulate
legislative history in ways that frustrate the majority will.   New textualists posit that members85
concentrate on the text of statutes and that legislative majorities express their policy preferences in
that text.  In contrast, legislators never formally vote to approve legislative history, which assumes
a lower profile than text.  By relying on legislative history, courts give effect to policies that were
not formally considered by all legislators and may even not have come to the attention of many
legislators.   In other words, legislative history provides a vehicle that legislative minorities can use
to create law without risking defeat by majority vote in the House or the Senate or veto by the
President.
Third, the interpretive use of legislative history increases the power of congressional staff by
allowing staff to set policies in documents that legislators never review.  Legislative history,
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particularly committee reports (the most prized legislative history)  are often drafted by staff with
little involvement by members.  Justice Scalia has warned that reliance on committee reports is
"converting a system of judicial construction into a system of committee-staff prescription."  If86
legislative history were disregarded, policies could gain authoritative recognition only if set forth in
legislation voted on by members of Congress and signed by the President.
Fourth, courts' use of legislative history allows lobbyists to smuggle their policies into the
law.   Lobbyists attempt to persuade staff members to place language favorable to their positions87
in committee reports. Because members do not involve themselves in the drafting of committee
reports, they do not review these interest group policies.  Thus, by recognizing committee reports
as authoritative, judges allow interest groups and their lobbyists to secure the "enactment" of policies
that could not garner a majority if openly debated.
Those who believe that legislative history has an important function in the interpretation of
statutes, either because they take an intentionalist approach of seeking to find legislative intent or
because, like me, they value certain aspects of legislative history independent of any attempt to
determine legislative intent, should reject the new textualists' instrumentalist arguments, even if on
balance they find them persuasive.  Adopting a new textualist approach for purely instrumentalist
reasons would denigrate majority rule, conflict with the courts’ primary role of dispute resolution,
and exhibit an unwarranted and uncharacteristic disrespect for congressional judgments about the
most efficacious manner in which to organize the legislative process.
First, jurists who adopt new textualism purely for instrumental reasons impose severe societal
costs by frustrating majority rule and denigrating the traditional role of courts in dispute resolution.
Every time judges refuse to adhere to congressional desires because of imprecise statutory language
or because Congress placed those desires in legislative history rather than in statutory text, judges
denigrate majority rule.  For judges who prize majority rule, determining how a majority of the
enacting legislature would have decided the issue had it arisen is central to proper interpretation.  To
them, the text of a statute has little inherent importance – its importance stems from its reflection of
the policy of the enacting legislative majority.  When the text of the statute does not reflect majority
desires, either because of imprecision in the use of language or the legislature's failure to fully
consider the nuances of problems, citizens are governed not by the policies reflecting majority views
but by random policies that result from the legislature's poor draftsmanship.  In effect, focusing on
statutory text despite convincing evidence that the statute's words inadvertently fail to reflect the
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majority's decision exalts form over substance by giving precedence to Congress's form of expression
rather than the ideas it sought to convey.88
By privileging text, the publicly expressed or otherwise-clear majority views regarding
citizens' rights and responsibilities may be violated.  Eventually, the principle desired by the majority
may be established, and Congress may even learn to draft statutes more precisely.  In the meantime,
however, costs are imposed upon individual litigants seeking resolution of their disputes.  While the
courts interpret statutes strategically to encourage greater congressional responsibility, these
individual litigants will suffer unjustly or benefit undeservedly because of poor congressional
drafting.  In a sense, individual litigants would become pawns in the judicial effort to force
legislative precision, to increase legislative deliberation, or to decrease dependence upon legislative
staff.  Injuries to litigants who rely on impartial justice to resolve their disputes are a significant89
price to pay for a judge's instrumentalism, particularly if the interpretive strategies used to force
change are likely to prove ineffective.90
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For example, the Supreme Court's insistence upon textual clarity deprived many litigants of
the benefits of policies that congressional majorities sought to establish by enacting the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).   The Supreme Court twice construed the91
ADEA provision that prohibited employee benefit plans from requiring mandatory retirement as a
means of avoiding the ADEA.   After each decision, Congress legislatively reversed the result of92
the cases by amending the statutory text to include policies Congress had previously expressed only
in legislative history.  Unsuccessful plaintiffs, whose cases were decided before Congress could93
convert the legislative history into statutory text, suffered.  The plaintiffs could not bring actions that
a congressional majority thought it had authorized.  While this result is just from an intrinsically
based, new textualist perspective, this series of judicial decisions and legislative reversals assumes
disturbing proportions for those who view intent as the touchstone of interpretation.  Moreover, the
disturbing nature of the harm to the individuals cannot be justified by the conviction that the courts'
interpretive approach will eventually lead to better legislation for all.
In short, as an instrumental technique, new textualism involves significant sacrifices.  It
denigrates majority rule and subordinates the responsibilities courts owe individual litigants to
further jurists' strategic efforts to improve the legislative process.
Moreover, new textualism embodies a skepticism of legislative judgments that, in other
contexts, courts eschew and new textualists disclaim. With respect to the issues new textualists
highlight – the vagueness of statutes, the reliability of congressional documents, and the role of staff
and interest groups – the new textualists appear willing to impose their own judgments upon
legislatures.  Significantly, Congress’ assessment of the legislative process appears to differ from
that of the new textualists.
Congress has embraced the use of imprecise statutes supplemented by legislative history; and
it frequently enacts legislation in just such a manner.  Congress has modified the procedures for
compiling committee reports and the Congressional Record, yet apparently has not concluded that
committee reports and the Congressional Record are unduly manipulable. Congress appears to have
concluded that staff and interest groups do not wield excessive power — or at least such influence
does not warrant changing the significance accorded to or the manner of compiling legislative
history.  Congress could address the new textualist concerns about statutory vagueness, manipulation
of legislative history by legislative minorities, and undue influence of staff and interest groups if it
chose to do so.  More generally, despite the vocal statements of new textualist academics and jurists,
members of Congress do not seem to have concluded that the use of legislative history is
problematic. Legislative history has hardly been the central battleground of internal or public
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pressure for congressional reform. And indeed, members of Congress appear to support the
continued use of legislative history in interpreting statutes.  Many even view legislative history as
a helpful tool in crafting legislation.
This new textualist willingness to review legislative judgments appears to conflict with the
deference that the courts in general, and the new textualists in particular, accord legislative
judgments in a wide variety of contexts. When addressing due process and equal protection
challenges to substantive legislation, federal and state courts often exhibit great deference to
legislative judgments.  When litigants challenge congressional procedures, federal courts show great
deference to legislative judgment, dismissing most such cases without even considering the
challenge's merits.  When litigants challenge certification by the presiding officers of the House and
the Senate that bills have been adopted in accordance with governing procedures, the courts do not
permit such challengers to proffer supporting evidence.  Each of these doctrines offers a striking
contrast to new textualism's dismissal of congressional judgments.
When a citizen challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the courts presume that the statute
can pass constitutional muster.  Unless a statute impairs a fundamental interest, such as freedom of
speech, or employs a suspect classification, such as race, courts will uphold any statute that has a
rational basis.  The requirement that government action have a rational basis is not a demanding one,
and under it the political branches receive considerable deference.  A court will hold that a statute
has a rational basis if any reasonably conceivable justification for the statute exists.  In effect, courts
leave Congress free to resolve issues on which reasonable people can disagree.   Such deference94
minimizes the counter-majoritarian difficulty.   Thus, when deferring to legislative judgments, the95
Supreme Court explains that it cannot engage in more aggressive judicial review without assuming
the role of a "superlegislature" or "Council of Revision" that merely substitutes its own value
judgments for the legislature's.   Indeed, in these substantive constitutional challenges, the Court96
refuses to consider claims that the statutory text reflects the intent of a mere legislative minority or
the undue influence of interest groups.   The new textualists' willingness to express disapproval of97
congressional decisions regarding the reliability of legislative history, the appropriate level of
statutory precision, and the role of staff and interest groups seems inconsistent with the deference
courts (and new textualists) accord congressional judgments when addressing due process or equal
protection challenges.
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Courts also defer to congressional judgments regarding appropriate legislative procedures
when legislators or citizens challenge the validity of those procedures directly.  Such procedural
challenges perhaps more closely resemble the new textualist challenges than do the substantive
constitutional challenges discussed above.  Often, in reliance on the Constitution's Rulemaking
Clause,  the Court refuses to entertain challenges to congressional procedures.    Lower courts have98 99
refused to consider challenges to the practice of allocating the majority party more than its
proportional share of seats on congressional committees, the congressionally-authorized practice of
concealing Central Intelligence Agency appropriations in other budget accounts,  and the100
establishment of a rule requiring a three-fifths majority vote to raise federal income tax rates.101
Even when courts do not summarily dismiss procedural claims, they accord extraordinary deference
to the legislature.  For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Senate, in considering articles
of impeachment, has discretion either to hear testimony itself or to delegate the task to a Senate
committee.   Likewise, the federal courts uphold revenue statutes against claims brought under the102
Constitution's Origination Clause  after only the most cursory examination of legislative records.103 104
Some rejected procedural challenges have raised issues resembling the complaints offered
by the new textualists.  Gregg v. Barrett  addressed claims resembling new textualists' concerns105
about the Congressional Record's manipulability.  In Gregg, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's
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challenges to the procedures for compiling the Congressional Record.  In rejecting the claim, Judge
Abner J. Mikva, writing for the court, explained that "our deference and esteem for [Congress] and
for the constitutional command that [Congress] be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us
from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem."
Likewise, the courts have refused to address questions of the proper role of legislative staff,
albeit in the context of challenges to the use of staff for non-legislative purposes.  Thus, in United
States ex rel . Joseph v. Cannon,  the D.C. Circuit refused to entertain a qui tam action seeking to106
recover from Senator Howard Cannon the salary his congressional office paid a staff member who
allegedly worked exclusively on matters relating to the Senator's re-election campaign.  In doing so,
the court explained that the judiciary must avoid questions for which it is "fundamentally under
equipped" and refused to "develop standards of conduct for matters not legal in nature."  The court
concluded that a "challenge to the interworkings of a Senator and his staff member raises at the
outset the specter that such a question lurks."
Even with respect to the validity of legislative documents, courts do not second-guess
legislative bodies.  The federal courts have long employed the enrolled bill rule, which precludes
them from questioning presiding legislative officers' certifications that the respective legislative
chambers have passed a bill pursuant to proper procedure.   Several justifications have been offered107
for this rule, however, the justification most relevant for our purposes is that the courts would show
disrespect for legislatures if they questioned such certifications by legislative officers.108
In many contexts, judges who find new textualism attractive berate their colleagues for
furthering controversial principles by means of judicial review and seeking to substitute judicial
judgments for those of elected representatives.  However, in espousing new textualism, these same
judges advocate, and seek to impose upon elected officials, their own controversial assessments of
the legislative process by means of an instrumentalist approach to statutory interpretation.  I will
briefly discuss the new textualist’s argument that legislative staff have too great an involvement in
the legislative process, as an example of new textualism’s reliance on very controversial assessments
of the legislative process.
New textualists’ perception that staff involvement in the legislative process is pervasive is
undoubtedly correct.  Staff members routinely participate in resolving policy differences among
members of Congress. Committee reports are primarily written by staffers and often are not fully
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reviewed by the whole committee or even a substantial portion of it.  Many have decried
congressional staff's increasing role in the legislative process.  Nevertheless, reasonable people have
long differed on the appropriate role of staff, and resolving the issue requires weighing competing
considerations.
 The concern about staff involvement in the legislative process is certainly legitimate.  At the
most basic level, legislators--not staff members--are elected to make laws.  To the extent that "law"
derives from staff decisions, it does not deserve the respect due "law" that is adopted by elected
representatives.   This complaint closely reflects new textualists' concerns.109 110
Michael Malbin has identified a more subtle injury produced by staffers' ubiquitous presence.
He argues that deliberation, the exposure of legislators to their fellow legislators' views, forms a
crucial part of the legislative process.   The ascendancy of legislative staffs has reduced members'111
direct contact with one another.  Issues legislators once would have resolved by direct contact are
now resolved in discussions among staff.  Malbin argues that hearing arguments indirectly through
staff rather than directly from fellow legislators reduces the likelihood that a member will seriously
consider those views.
The increased number of staffers and their greater involvement in the legislative process
produces benefits, however.  Given the relatively small number of legislators and the great demands
on their time, staff surely reduces legislators' dependence on the executive branch, congressional
leadership, committee chairs, and interest groups, and it also allows them to exercise more
independent judgment. Staff may also enable members to consider more issues in greater depth than
they could without staff assistance.  In periodically expanding the size of various legislative staffs
since the 1960s, Congress has clearly concluded that the presence of staff provides a necessary
enhancement of Congress's ability to make independent and informed judgments and that those
benefits outweigh concerns about increasing the role of staff vis-a-vis members of Congress. 
The concern about the democratic pedigree of agreements made between unelected
representatives is ameliorated by members' absolute control over staff.  Staff have no formal
independence and must be careful not to displease the congressperson for whom they work, and there
may well be informal mores and pressures that ensure that staff members do not act in ways that are
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contrary to their employers' interests.  For instance, Malbin concludes that staffers efforts as policy
entrepreneurs generally reflect the legislators' interests, not those of the staffs.
Given the members' time constraints, as well as the breadth and complexity of issues they
must address, it may not be possible to reduce the current level of staff involvement in the legislative
process. Indeed, the Supreme Court long ago reconciled itself to the high level of staff participation
in agency decisionmaking.  The Court, in a series of decisions from 1936 to 1941, decided that the
degree of staff involvement in administrative decisionmaking does not provide a basis for
challenging those decisions.  Initially, in the first of four decisions in Morgan v. United States, the
Court declared that the agency official "who decides must hear," meaning that the official who
decides an issue must personally consider and appraise the relevant evidence.   Thus, the Supreme112
Court held that the trial court had erred in dismissing a claim that the Secretary of Agriculture's order
setting the maximum livestock prices could not stand because the Secretary had not personally heard
or read any of the relevant evidence.   In the succeeding series of decisions revisiting the113
controversy, the Court ultimately found its effort to police the level of staff involvement in
administrative decisionmaking to be unworkable.  114
The legitimate difference of opinion concerning the costs and benefits attendant to legislative
staffs' current role suggests that the issue of the level of staff involvement is not an appropriate one
for judicial resolution. Moreover, Congress has not ignored staffing issues.  Rather, Congress revisits
and acts on the subject periodically and even considered the subject during the recent comprehensive
examination of its organization.  In 1995, the House  reduced committee staffs by one-third.  115
Finally, the disregard of legislative history would not cure the problem of excessive staff
involvement in the legislative process, even if we were to concede the correctness of the new
textualists' perceptions and judgments about the excessive influence of staff.  The ubiquity of staff
and the time constraints on legislators mean that staff are no less involved in drafting and negotiating
statutory text than in drafting and negotiating legislative history.  Members of Congress have no
more time to parse statutory language than they do to consider the more readable legislative history.
Thus, an exclusive focus on legislative history will almost certainly not change the congressional
dynamic that has led to the omnipresent and central role of staff.  In short, the new textualist
argument for disregarding legislative history because of staff involvement again involves improper




In many ways the conventional approach to interpreting statutes, reading text in the context
of limited portions of legislative history, is a sound approach in need of a supporting theory. As we
have seen, justifying the use of legislative history based on the concept of legislative intent has
produced two consequences. First, when scholars, from Max Radin to the new textualists, began to
argue that the legislature could only be treated as the sum of individual legislators, the notion of
legislative intent became untenable. Even when scholars who found legislative intent useful argued
that a legislature should be viewed as an institution in which authority is delegated to certain
institutional actors subject to expressions of assent by the entire chamber, they did not provide a
convincing normative reason for viewing the vote on the statute as an endorsement of the
explanatory statements provided by the institutional actors. Second, the concept of "legislative
intent," in conjunction with both the argument that the legislature is merely the sum of individuals
and the documentation of more of the legislative process, has produced serious methodological
consequences. Interpretation of statutes has almost become a factual inquiry into subjective intent
in which courts either lack the most probative evidence or seem to arbitrarily refuse to pursue all the
relevant evidence.
The public justification approach addresses these problems. It provides a basis for asserting
that legislatures have a duty not merely to enact statutes, but to explain them as well, and that
accordingly legislators have a duty to respond to the institutional explanations of those statutes. The
public justification approach allows courts to examine legislative history without conceiving of the
interpretive task as a factual inquiry into subjective intent and provides something of a guide to
distinguishing documents that should be given weight in the interpretive process from those
documents that should not.
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